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Abstract
Price caps are often used by policy makers to "regulate markets". Previous analyses have
focussed on the "supply side" impact of these caps, and derived the optimal price cap, which max-
imizes investment and welfare. This article expands the analysis to include the "demand side"
impact of price caps: when prices can no longer rise, customers must be rationed to adjust demand
to available supply. This yields two new ndings, that contradict previous analyses. First, the
welfare-maximizing cap is higher than the capacity-maximizing cap, since increasing the cap in-
creases gross surplus when customers are rationed. Second, in somes cases, the capacity-maximizing
cap leads to lower capacity and welfare than no cap. These ndings underscores the importance
for policy makers to examine the impact on customers when they impose price caps.
Keywords: price caps, imperfect competition, rationing, investment incentives
JEL Classication: L13, L94
1 Introduction
Price caps are widely used policy instruments. In electricity markets for example, System Operators
and policy makers impose caps on prices, either formally or through operating practices (Joskow
(2007)). Rent controls, in place in various jurisdictions, constitute a form of price cap. Regulation of
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infrastructure, for example telecommunication and electric power networks, often relies on price caps.
Prices of medical procedures and drugs are capped in many countries (Schut and Van de Ven (2005),
Mougeot and Naegelen (2005)). Salary caps exist in many sport leagues (Késenne (2000)). Following
the 2008 nancial crisis, the possibility of capping extremely high compensations, for example those
of traders and CEOs, has been discussed in Europe and in the United States. Economic analysis of
price caps (reviewed below) has sofar focussed on their impact on supply. By extending the analysis
to include their impact on demand, in particular rationing, this article provides new insights. Policy
makers should therefore carefully assess the demand-side impact of price caps in decision making.
Economists have long held reservations about the use of price caps. The argument can be framed
using a simple two-period model1. Firms (or individuals) invest in period 1, and receive prots in
period 2, during which a cap is imposed on prices. Conventional wisdom is that increasing the cap
increases prices, hence prots in period 2, hence investment in period 1, hence lead to higher overall
welfare.
While this result holds if the industry considered is perfectly competitive, matters are more complex
if competition is imperfect and demand in period 2 uncertain. Earle et al. (2007) and Zöttl (2011)
show that, under mild assumptions on the shape of the demand function, contrary to the previous
result, increasing the cap in a certain range reduces investment.
The intuition for this surprising result is that price caps also have a second impact on investment
incentives: increasing the cap reduces the probability that the cap is binding, which reduces expected
prots, hence investment. Earle et al. (2007) show that the rst e¤ect dominates if the price cap
is close the marginal cost, while the second e¤ect dominates if the cap is su¢ ciently high. Building
on this analysis, Zöttl (2001) derives the capacity-maximizing price cap for a certain class of demand
functions, and shows that this cap leads to higher investment and welfare than the absence of cap.
These results are extremely important, as they provide strong justication for the use of price caps.
However, the previous analysis is incomplete, that ignores the demand-side impact of price caps:
when a cap is imposed, demand must be rationed. By including rationing in the analysis, this article
shows that price caps are less benecial than suggested by the previous literature.
1Recent articles, for example Evans and Guthrie (2012), and Roques and Favva (2009), have examined the dynamic
e¤ects of price caps. While they rene our understanding of the supply-side e¤ects of price caps, they have not addressed
the demand side e¤ects, which is the contribution of this article.
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Consider, as in Earle et al. (2007) and Zöttl (2011) that demand in period 2 varies, and is uncertain
at the time of investment in period 1. When the cap is binding, prices can no longer rise, hence cannot
reduce demand. Some form of rationing is required to adjust demand to available supply. In power
markets, System Operators administratively decide which customers to cut, a practice known as rolling
blackouts. In other markets, rst-come rst-served is the method of rationing. In other situations,
non monetary benets, such as knowledge of the sellers, family ties, a¢ liation to a political party, or
social status may be used for rationing.
The marginal welfare impact of increasing the price cap is thus the sum of two terms: (i) the
marginal impact on capacity, as identied by Earle et al. (2007) and Zöttl (2011), and (ii) the
marginal impact on gross consumers surplus. The capacity maximizing price cap sets rst the term
to zero. Under reasonable assumptions, increasing the cap increases gross surplus when customers
are rationed: demand is lower, hence less stringent rationing is required. Thus, welfare increases by
increasing the cap from the capacity maximizing level. This intuition is formalized in Proposition 1.
The analysis can be further expanded. Suppose that a fraction of consumers does not respond
to prices. This is the case in the power industry, where some customers face a xed retail price,
that does not vary in real-time to follow the wholesale price. This is also the case in the health-care
industry, where the price for most drugs and procedures does not vary as demand varies. Demand
is adjusted to available supply through two channels: price increase for price-reactive customers,
and rationing for constant-price customers. The need to maintain consistency between these two
adjustment mechanisms imposes an upper limit on admissible price caps.
In this setting, Proposition 2 derives a su¢ cient condition for the capacity-maximizing cap to
induce lower capacity than no cap, even under Zöttl (2011) su¢ cient conditions.
Finally, by combining Propositions 1 and 2, Proposition 3 proves that, if the capacity-maximizing
cap leads to lower capacity than no cap, imposition of a price cap reduces welfare. Thus, by including
their impact on rationing Proposition 3, weakens previous results on the desirability of price caps.
The situation described in Proposition 3 is empirically relevant, as illustrated on a simplied
representation of the French electric power market.
The policy implications of this analysis are straightforward: when considering price caps, policy
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makers and analysts should not only examine their impact on supply, but also their impact on demand,
in particular rationing of excess demand. The welfare impact of this rationing should be evaluated,
as it may exceed the supply-side benets of the cap.
This article brings together two strands of the literature. On the supply side, the analysis of price
cap under uncertainty was initially developed by Earle et al. (2007). The peak-load pricing analysis,
that underpins the analysis, was initially developed by Boiteux (1949), and Crew and Kleindorfer
(1976). This article builds on the previously discussed two-stage Cournot model developed by Zöttl
(2011), which incorporate price caps into peak-load pricing.
On the demand side, this article applies the formalism of rationing, in particular the Value of Lost
Load, developed in the electricity economics literature, as summarized for example by Joskow and
Tirole (2007) and Stoft (2002). The dichotomy between "price reactive" customers and "constant
price customers" was developed by Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2007).
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setup and the equilibrium Cournot
investment. It expends Zöttl (2011) by considering an additional and empirically relevant case.
Section 3 proves the di¤erence between the capacity-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing caps.
Section 4 extends the analysis to include constant price customers. Section 5 proves that, in this
case, no price cap may sometimes yields higher welfare than the capacity maximizing cap. Section 6
illustrates the analysis on the French power markets. Finally, Section 7 presents concluding remarks
and avenues for further research. Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Cournot competition with uncertain demand and a price cap
2.1 Demand, supply, and curtailment
Underlying demand All customers are homogenous. Individual demand is D (p; t), where p is the
electricity price, and t  0 is the state of the world, distributed according to cumulative distribution
F (:), and probability distribution f (:) = F
0
(:), common to all stakeholders.
Inverse demand P (Q; t) is dened by D (P (q; t) ; t) = Q. Gross consumers surplus is S (p; t) =R D(p;t)
0 P (q; t) dq.
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Assumption 1 8t  0, 8q  Q, the inverse demand P (Q; t) satises
Pq (Q; t) < min (0; qPqq (Q; t)) and Pt (Q; t) > q jPqt (Q; t)j  0:
Pq < 0 requires inverse demand to be downward sloping. Pq (Q; t) <  qPqq (Q; t) implies that the
marginal revenue is decreasing with output
@2
@q2
(qP (Q; t)) = 2Pq (Q; t) + qPqq (Q; t) < 0;
and guarantees existence and unicity of a Cournot equilibrium.
Pt > 0 orders the states of the world, Pt (Q; t) > q jPqt (Q; t)j implies that the marginal revenue is
increasing with the state of the world
@2
@t@q
(qP (Q; t)) = Pt (Q; t) + qPqt (Q; t) > 0;
and that the Cournot output and prot (dened later) are increasing.
Assumption 1 is met for example if demand is linear with constant slope P (Q; t) = a (t)   bQ,
with b > 0 and a0 (t) > 0.
In this and the next Section, all customers face and respond to the spot price. In Sections 4 and
later, we introduce constant price customers.
Supply This article considers a single production technology, with marginal cost c > 0 and invest-
ment cost r. The peak load pricing literature proves that a single technology is su¢ cient to analyze
total installed capacity, that depends solely on the characteristics of the marginal technology (see for
example Boiteux (1949) for the perfect competition case and Zöttl (2011) for the imperfect competition
case).
I assume consuming the rst unit is valuable P (0; t) > c and E [P (0; t)] > (c+ r). This guarantees
existence of a positive equilibrium investment.
Imperfect competition The industry is composed of N producers, that play a two-stage game:
in stage 1, producer n installs capacity kn; in stage 2 he produces qn (t)  kn in state t and sells it
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entirely in the spot market. Producers are assumed to compete à la Cournot in the spot markets,
facing inverse demand P (Q; t). Stage 2 can be interpreted as a repetition of multiple states of the
world over a given period (for example one year), drawn from the distribution F (:).
The game is solved by backwards induction: producers rst compute spot market prots from a
Nash equilibrium given installed capacities
 
k1; :::; kN

in each state of the world t; then they make
their investment choice in stage 1 using the expectation of these spot market prots.
Q (t) =
NX
n=1
qn (t) and K =
NX
n=1
kn are respectively aggregate production in state t and aggre-
gate installed capacity. KC is the equilibrium capacity referred to as the "Cournot" capacity in the
following.
Price cap and curtailment To limit the exercise of market power, policy makers impose a cap pW
on the spot price. In power markets, the price cap may be a formal cap, or the result of operational
practices that depress prices (see Joskow (2007)). The price cap must be higher than the long-term
marginal cost of the rst unit, otherwise it would block any investment. At the other extreme, the
price cap must be binding in some states of the world, otherwise it would be useless. Anticipating on
Lemma 1 below, dene KC (p) the Cournot capacity when the price cap is p. The highest binding cap
is p1, uniquely dened by
lim
t!+1P
 
KC (p1) ; t

= p1:
Then, pW veries
(c+ r)  pW  p1:
The rst state of the world for which the price cap is binding for productionQ is denoted t^0
 
Q; pW

,
and uniquely dened by
P
 
Q; t^0
 
Q; pW

= pW :
If the price cap is never binding, t^0
 
Q; pW
! +1.
For states of the world where the cap is binding, the price cannot rise to lower demand. When
this occurs and the rms produce at capacity, administrative action is required to curtail (or ration) a
fraction of customers, hence to reduce demand to match available supply. To describe the economics
or rationing, I use the formalism developed in the electric power literature, that can be applied to
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other industries.
The serving ratio is denoted  2 [0; 1]:  = 0 means full curtailment, while  = 1 means no
curtailment. For state t, D (p; ; t) is the demand for (xed) price p and serving ratio , and S (p; ; t)
is the gross consumer surplus. By construction, D (p; 1; t)  D (p; t) and S (p; 1; t)  S (p; t).
Since customers are homogeneous, there is no basis to discriminate among them. Thus, curtailment
is proportional, for example proceeds by geographic zones. This yields
D (p; ; t) = D (p; t) :
Joskow and Tirole (2007) illustrate on a simple example how the net surplus (S (p; ; t)  pD (p; ; t))
depends on the information consumers hold about the curtailment. Suppose rst rationing is perfectly
anticipated, i.e., consumers know exactly who will be rationed. The fraction  of customers that will
not be curtailed consumes normally, hence receives surplus S (p; t) per customer. The fraction (1  )
of customers that will be curtailed does not attempt to consume, hence receives no surplus. At the
aggregate level, this yields
S (p; ; t) = S (p; t) :
If rationing is not perfectly anticipated, customers who end up not being curtailed may refrain
from consuming, hence receive no surplus. Conversely, consumers that end up being curtailed may
attempt to consume, hence derive a negative surplus when they are curtailed (e.g., they step in an
elevator and nd out power is cut).
When curtailment occurs, the Value of Lost Load (V oLL) represents the value consumers would
place on an extra unit. Formally, it is dened as
v (p; ; t) =
@S
@
@D
@
(p; ; t) :
If rationing is perfectly anticipated, the V oLL is always higher than the price:
v (p; ; t) =
@S
@
@D
@
(p; ; t) =
S (p; t)
D (p; t)
> p;
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and is increasing in price:
@v
@p
=
D (p; t) @S(p;t)@p   S (p; t) @D(p;t)@p
(D (p; t))2
=
pD (p; t)  S (p; t)
(D (p; t))2
@D (p; t)
@p
=
p  v (p; ; t)
D (p; t)
@D (p; t)
@p
> 0:
It seems reasonable to assume these properties also hold when rationing is not perfectly anticipated.
Consumers are always willing to pay at least as much for one unit when they are curtailed as they are
when they are not curtailed. Ceteris paribus, this value increases as price increases.
When curtailment occurs, the serving ratio for installed capacity K and constant price p is deter-
mined such that
D (p; ; t) = K:
The impact of increasing p on consumerssurplus is
dS
dp
=
@S
@p
+
@S
@
@
@p
=
@S
@p
  v (p; ; t) @D
@p
;
since, from the denition of ,
@
@p
=  
@D
@p
@D
@
) @S
@
@
@p
=  @S
@
@D
@p
@D
@
=  v (p; ; t) @D
@p
:
An increase in price p reduces the gross surplus, but also reduces demand, valued at v. If rationing is
anticipated,
@S
@p
  v@D
@p
= p
@D
@p
  v@D
@p
=   @D
@p
(v   p) > 0;
the demand e¤ect is larger than the surplus e¤ect, hence an increase in price increases the gross
surplus. Again, it seems reasonable that this assumption holds for other rationing technologies. These
points are formalized in the following:
Assumption 2 The V oLL is higher than the price, and, ceteris paribus, increasing in price:
v (p; ; t) > p and
@v
@p
> 0:
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The total impact of an increase in price is an increase in gross consumer surplus:
dS
dp
=
@S
@p
+
@S
@
@
@p
> 0:
As previously mentioned, the formalism of V oLL has been developed in the power industry (hence
its name). It applies more generally in any situation where rationing occurs.
2.2 Equilibrium investment
Suppose rst no price cap is imposed. The peak load pricing literature shows that two periods must
be separated in describing the structure of the equilibrium: o¤-peak, when production is lower than
capacity, rms play a standard Cournot equilibrium with marginal cost c. Aggregate production in
state t is the Cournot output, denoted QC (c; t), and dened by
P
 
QC ; t

+
QC
N
Pq
 
QC ; t

= c:
Wholesale price is P
 
QC (c; t) ; t

, and individual prot is Q
C(c;t)
N
 
P
 
QC (c; t) ; t
  c.
The rst on-peak state of the world, denoted t^ (K; c), is such that the Cournot output is equal to
the aggregate capacity K:
QC
 
c; t^

= K , P  QC  c; t^ ; t^+ QC
N
 
c; t^

Pq
 
QC
 
c; t^

; t^

= c:
t^ (K; c) is increasing in both arguments by inspection.
On-peak, in state t  t^ (K; c), rms produce at capacity, wholesale price is P (K; t), and individual
prot is KN (P (K; t)  c).
Suppose now a price cap is imposed. Two situations may occur: either the price cap is binding
o¤-peak, i.e., the Cournot price reaches the cap before the Cournot output reaches aggregate capacity,
or the price cap is binding on-peak, i.e., the Cournot output reaches aggregate capacity before the
price reaches the cap. The latter situation occurs if and only if
t^ (K; c)  t^0
 
K; pW

: (1)
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It is more likely is competition is stronger (N larger) and the cap higher. For example, as N ! +1,
t^ (:; :)! t^0 (:; :), and condition (1) is always met since c < pW .
The marginal value of capacity when all producers invest kn = KN is denoted 	
 
K; pW

. The
functional form of 	
 
K; pW

depends on which constraint is binding rst. 	
 
K; pW

is thus dened
piecewise, as shown below:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium capacity KC
 
pW

is characterized by:
	
 
KC ; pW

= 0
where 	
 
K; pW

is dened as follows:
1. If the price cap is reached on-peak (i.e., t^ (K; c)  t^0
 
K; pW

),
	
 
K; pW

= 	1
 
K; pW

=
Z t^0(K;pW )
t^(K;c)

P (K; t) +
K
N
Pq (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt r:
(2)
2. If the price cap is reached o¤-peak (i.e., t^0
 
K; pW

< t^ (K; c)),
	
 
K; pW

= 	2
 
K; pW

=
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r: (3)
Proof. If the price cap is reached on-peak, Zöttl (2011)derives 	1
 
K; pW

and proves the solution
of 	1
 
K; pW

= 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Intuition for 	1
 
K; pW

is as follows. A
marginal capacity increase has no impact o¤-peak. On peak, it generates marginal prot (p  c). If the
cap is not binding, it also yields a price reduction, hence the net e¤ect is
 
P (K; t) + KN Pq (K; t)  c

.
When the cap is binding, there is price no reduction, and the net e¤ect is
 
pW   c.
The formal proof for the price cap reached o¤-peak is presented in Appendix A. Intuition for
	2
 
K; pW

is as follows. When the cap is binding, the wholesale price is set at the cap. O¤-peak,
rms produce below capacity, hence a marginal increase in capacity has no impact of prots. On-
peak arises when demand for price pW reaches capacity, i.e., for t = t^0
 
K; pW

. On-peak, rms
produce at capacity. A marginal increase in capacity generates additional margin
 
pW   c. This
yields 	2
 
K; pW

. Appendix A proves this constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 extends Zöttl (2011) Theorem 1 by including the case t^0
 
K; pW

< t^ (K; c). This is an
empirically relevant extension: since power markets are highly concentrated, and price caps often very
low, imperfectly competitive price may reach the cap before generation produces at capacity. This
occurs for example in the numerical illustration presented in Section 6.
One surprising implication of Lemma 1 is that, if the cap is reached o¤-peak, the optimal capacity
does not depend on the number of rms. This is counter-intuitive for Cournot games. The intuition is
that, since the cap binding o¤-peak, on-peak arises when demand at the price cap equals the capacity
(i.e., t^0
 
K; pW

), which does not depend on the number of rms. Then, on-peak, price is set at the
cap, which again does not depend on the number of rms.
This result underscores the complexity of the analysis of the imposition of price caps.
3 Capacity and welfare-maximizing caps for price reactive consumers
3.1 Capacity-maximizing cap
Di¤erentiation of rst-order conditions (2) and (3) yield:
dKC
dp
=
1  F  t^0  KC (p) ; p  (p  c) f  t^0  KC (p) ; p @t^0(KC(p);p)@p   @	@K  : (4)
where @	@K =
@	1
@K (resp.
@	
@K =
@	2
@K ) if the price cap is reached on-peak (resp. o¤-peak). The
denominator is positive. The rst term of the numerator is positive and the second term negative.
These two terms illustrate the two impacts of a price cap on installed capacity: on the one hand,
increasing the cap raises the per unit prot when the cap is binding, hence increases investment
incentives. On the other hand, it reduces the probability that the cap is binding, hence the rm loses
the margin (p  c) for the relevant states of the world. As observed by Earle and al. (2007), under
reasonable assumptions on demand and distribution of states of the world, the rst e¤ect dominates
when the cap is close to (c+ r), while the second e¤ect dominates when the price is high enough.
This produces a capacity-maximizing cap, as derived by Zöttl (2011). For the readers convenience,
the proof is presented in the Appendix B. Its main steps are summarized below.
KC (p) is continuously di¤erentiable on the compact set [(c+ r) ; p1], thus, admits a maximum. If
Pt (D ((c+ r) ; 0) ; 0) > rf (0), which I assume holds, dK
C
dp (c+ r) > 0, hence (c+ r) is not a maximum.
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p1 is not a maximum either: we can nd pW < p1 such that KC (p1) < KC
 
pW

. Therefore, the
maximum of KC (p) is interior, hence veries dK
C
dp = 0. This constitutes a necessary condition, as
KC (p) may admit multiple extrema.
3.2 Welfare-maximizing cap
The social welfare depends on which constraint is reached rst. Suppose rst the cap is reached
on-peak. Social welfare is then
W (K; p) = W1 (K; p) =
Z t^(K;c)
0
 
S
 
P
 
QC ; t

; t
  cQC f (t) dt+ Z t^0(K;pW )
t^(K;c)
(S (P (K; t) ; t)  cK) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 S  pW ; ; t  cK f (t) dt  rK;
where the serving ratio  is such that D  pW ; ; t = K. The rst term corresponds to o¤-peak,
the second to on-peak before the cap is binding, and the last to on-peak when the cap is binding
and rationing occurs, in which case, consumers surplus is S  pW ; ; t. Since output is a continuous
function of the state of the world, so is surplus. Only the derivatives of the integrands appear in dW
dpW
.
Thus,
dW1
dpW
=
@W1
@K
dKC
dpW
+
@W1
@pW
=
 Z t^0(KC(pW );pW )
t^(KC(pW );c)
 
P
 
KC
 
pW

; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )

@S
@
@
@K
  c

f (t) dt  r
!
dKC
dpW
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )

@S
@p
+
@S
@
@
@p

f (t) dt:
Aggregate capacity has no impact on the o¤-peak surplus, hence only on-peak terms appears in dW1
dpW
.
Expression of the last integrand has already been computed. To compute the second integrand, observe
that, from the denition of ,
@
@K
=
1
@D
@
) @S
@
@
@K
=
@S
@
@D
@
= v (p; ; t) :
12
Thus,
dW1
dpW
=
 Z t^0(KC(pW );pW )
t^(KC(pW );c)
 
P
 
KC
 
pW

; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )
 
v
 
pW ; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r! dKC
dpW
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )

@S
@p
  v  pW ; ; t @D
@p

f (t) dt:
Observing that v
 
pW ; ; t
  c =  v  pW ; ; t  pW +  pW   c and inserting the rst-order condi-
tion dening KC yields
dW1
dpW
=
 Z t^0(KC(pW );pW )
t^(KC(pW );c)
 K
C
N
Pq
 
KC ; t

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )
 
v
 
pW ; ; t
  pW  f (t) dt! dKC
dpW
(5)
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )

@S
@p
  v  pW ; ; t @D
@p

f (t) dt:
The term multiplying dK
C
dpW
is positive, since v
 
pW ; ; t

> pW by Assumption 2. The last integral
is positive by Assumption 2.
A similar analysis shows that, if the price cap is reached o¤-peak,
W (K; p) = W2 (K; p) =
Z t^0(QC ;pW )
0
 
S
 
P
 
QC ; t

; t
  cQC f (t) dt
+
Z t^0(K;pW )
t^0(QC ;pW )
 
S
 
pW ; t
  cD  pW ; t f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 S  pW ; ; t  cK f (t) dt  rK;
and
dW2
dpW
=
 Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )
 
v
 
pW ; ; t
  pW  f (t) dt! dKC
dpW
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(pW );pW )

@S
@p
  v  pW ; ; t @D
@p

f (t) dt:
(6)
Again, the term multiplying dK
C
dpW
and the second integral are positive.
The analysis above yields the following:
Proposition 1 Increasing the cap from the capacity-maximizing cap always increases welfare. If
KC (:) is globally concave, the unique capacity-maximizing cap is lower than the welfare-maximizing
cap, which is strictly lower than p1.
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Proof. As seen previously, the capacity-maximizing cap p^W veries dK
C
dpW
 
p^W

= 0. Then,
dW
dpW
 
p^W

=
Z +1
t^0(KC ;p^W )

@S
@p
  v  p^W ; ; t @D
@p

f (t) dt > 0:
Thus, a marginal increase in the cap always increases welfare.
Since W
 
KC (p) ; p

is continuous on the compact set [(c+ r) ; p1], a welfare maximizing cap pW
exists. If KC (:) is globally concave, KC (:) hence W (:) are increasing on the left of p^W . pW cannot
be lower than p^W . Finally,
dW
dpW
(p1) =
dW1
dpW
(p1) =
 Z +1
t^(KC(p1);c)
 K
C (p1)
N
Pq
 
KC (p1) ; t

f (t) dt
!
dKC
dpW
< 0;
thus p1 cannot be welfare maximizing, therefore pW < p1.
Proposition 1 extends the previous analyses of price caps, which have focussed on their impact on
supply, and have ignored their impact on demand, in particular customers rationing. In other words,
previous analyses have concentrated on the rst term in dW
dpW
and ignored the second.
This second term matters for policy makers. In addition to modify investment incentives, imposing
a price cap when demand varies and the good is non storable means to some customers must be
curtailed. Curtailment reduces welfare, as consumers are willing to pay more when curtailed than
when they are not.
A direct and counterintuitive consequence of Proposition 1 is that KC
 
pW

< KC
 
p^W

: to
maximize welfare, lower capacity than the maximum must be installed. The intuition is that the gains
from reducing curtailments exceed the gains from additional capacity.
Policy makers should therefore attempt to quantity the impact of rationing when deciding on the
imposition of price caps.
Proposition 1 shows that imposing the optimal price cap increases welfare compared to the never
binding cap, which justies the use of price cap. As will see in Sections 4 and later, it does not always
hold if a fraction of customers face constant prices.
Finally, it is worth observing that even the welfare-maximizing cap yields lower capacity than
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rst-best K, uniquely dened by
	0 (K
; c) =
Z +1
t^0(K;c)
(P (K; t)  c) f (t) dt  r = 0: (7)
The marginal social value of capacity is simply the on-peak expected di¤erence between the price and
the marginal operating cost. At the optimum, this marginal value equals the marginal investment
cost.
Suppose rst the price cap is binding on-peak. Inserting equation (7) into equation (3) yields
	1
 
K; pW

=
Z t^0(K;pW )
t^(K;c)

P (K; t) +
K
N
Pq (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt
 
Z +1
t^0(K;c)
(P (K; t)  c) f (t) dt
=  
Z t^(K;c)
t^0(K;c)
(P (K; c)  c) f (t) dt+
Z t^0(K;pW )
t^(K;c)
K
N
Pq (K; t) f (t) dt
 
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 
P (K; t)  pW  f (t) dt
< 0:
Since 	1 (:; :) is decreasing in its rst argument, KC
 
pW

< K for all pW binding on-peak. The
same argument applies to caps binding o¤-peak. Thus KC
 
pW

< K.
Even the optimal cap yields lower investment than the rst best, for two reasons: rst, imperfect
competition leads to strategic under-investment. This produces the rst two terms in the equation
above (that disappear is the cap is binding o¤-peak). However, even if competition is perfect, i.e.,
N ! +1 and t^ (:; :)! t^0 (:; :), a cap reduces investment compared to the rst best: when the cap is
binding, producers value the good at the cap pW , and not its true underlying value P (K; t). Since the
latter is higher than the former when the cap is binding by construction, this yields under-investment.
4 Introducing constant price customers
Suppose now only a fraction  > 0 of customers face and react to real time wholesale price ("price
reactive" customers), while the remaining fraction (1  ) of customers face constant price pR in
all states of the world ("constant price" customers). For example price reactive customers purchase
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directly from the wholesale spot markets, while retailers serve constant price customers. The economics
of retailing in this setting are discussed for example by Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Léautier
(2014).
The presence of constant price customers is an essential characteristic of electric power markets,
hence the analysis presented below uses electricity market vocabulary.
The analysis also apply to other markets where a fraction of customers pay the same price for
the good irrespective of market conditions. Consider health care provision. In many countries, most
customers pay the same price for a medical procedure, whether demand is high or low compared to
supply. For example, the cost of a receiving an injection of a inuenza vaccine is the same in the fall,
before the u season, and in the spring, after the u season. Rationing is organized through waiting
times (Schut and Van de Ven (2005)).
Having consumers pay a constant price, independent of the state of the world, may be a technical
imperative, or a policy decision. In the electric power industry, the impossibility to measure consump-
tion in real time and inform users about real time prices, has lead to a large fraction of customers
facing a constant price. This constraint is progressively lifted by the advent of smart meters. Yet, few
countries to date have embraced real-time pricing, for fear of transferring price risk onto households.
In the health care industry, other reasons, for example transaction costs, or an imperative of fairness,
may justify the use of xed prices.
This article is not discussing the appropriateness of xed price policies. It examines how introduc-
ing constant price customers interacts with the imposition of price caps.
4.1 Constant price customers, selective curtailment, and residual inverse demand
To introduce the notation, suppose rst no price cap imposed.
Since a fraction of customers does not react to real time price, there may be instances when the
System Operator (SO) has no alternative but to curtail demand, i.e., to interrupt supply.
Assumption 3 The SO has the technical ability to curtail "constant price" consumers while not
curtailing "price reactive" customers.
Assumption 3 holds only partially today in electricity markets: most SOs can only organize
curtailment by geographical zones, and cannot di¤erentiate by type of customer. It will hold fully in a
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few years, when "smart meters" are rolled out, as is mandated in most European countries and many
US states.
Dene  (Q; t) the residual inverse demand curve with possible curtailment of constant price cus-
tomers
 (Q; t) = P
 
Q  (1  )D  pR; ; t

; t
!
(8)
where  is the optimal serving ratio in state t for production Q.
Price reactive customers face the wholesale spot price  (Q; t), hence are never curtailed at the
optimum. O¤-peak, demand is low, and rms play a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with residual
demand  (Q; t). On-peak, demand is equal to installed capacity K, and the wholesale price is  (K; t).
As long as  (K; t)  v  pR; 1; t, constant price customers are not curtailed in state t. If  (K; t) >
v
 
pR; 1; t

, then,  < 1 is set to equalize constant price customersV oLL and the wholesale price:
v
 
pR; ; t

=  (K; t) :
For production Q, dene2 t (Q) the rst state of the world for which the price equal the V oLL:
 (Q; t) = v
 
pR; 1; t

:
Under perfect competition, price equals marginal cost when Q  K, hence the V oLL may be reached
only on-peak. If demand is elastic enough, price may never reach the V oLL, in which case t (Q)! +1.
If competition is imperfect and residual demand is very inelastic (e.g.,  very low), the price may
reach the V oLL o¤-peak. In that case, there exists t such that

 
QC (c; t) ; t

= v
 
pR; 1; t

:
For t  t, as long as the market is o¤-peak, the SO sets the wholesale price at v  pR; 1; t. No rationing
2t is a function of all the parameters of the residual demand function, in particular  and pR. The notation t (Q) is
used since the dependency on production Q is the most important. This simplication is used for all functions used in
the analysis.
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occurs, since there is spare capacity. On-peak is reached when
D
 
v
 
pR; 1; t

; t

+ (1  )D  pR; 1; t = K ,  (K; t) = v  pR; 1; t, t = t (K) :
On-peak, constant price customers are curtailed, and the price is the V oLL for the optimal curtailment:
 (K; t) = v
 
pR; ; t

.
I assume that the xed price pR is su¢ ciently high for the V oLL to always be higher than the
long-term marginal cost of production, i.e.,
v
 
pR; 1; 0

> (c+ r) ;
otherwise constant price customers would never be served.
Additional assumptions on the inverse demand and rationing technology are required to ensure
that  (Q; t) is well-behaved, in particular satises Assumption 1. I use the following notation: if no
rationing occurs, q =
1
Pq

Q (1 )D(pR;t)
 ; t

; when rationing occurs, q =
@v
@K =
@v
@
@
@K .
Assumption 4 Properties of the inverse demand and rationing technology. For all t  0, Q  q  0,
 2 (0; 1] 0, pR > 0, and  2 (0; 1]: (i) the marginal revenue does not increase as production increases,
q (Q; t) + qqq (Q; t)  0, (ii) the marginal revenue increases as the state of the world increases,
t (Q; t)+q
qt (Q; t) > 0, (iii) the V oLL does not increase as the serving ratio increases, @v@  0 and
increases as the state of the world increases @v@t > 0, and (iv)



@D
@p
@v
@t +
@D
@t

+ (1  ) @D@t

> 0.
If no rationing occurs, Pt (Q; t) > 0 and Pq (Q; t) < 0 are su¢ cient to guarantee that t (Q; t) >
0, q (Q; t) < 0.
Suppose now rationing occurs for t  t (K). As shown in Appendix C, @v@  0 guarantees that
@
@K > 0 and
@v
@K  0. Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that the second derivatives of v
 
pR; ; t

have
the desired properties. Conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the optimal serving ratio decreases as
the state of the world increases: @

@t < 0. If curtailment occurs in state t, it also occurs in all states
t  t. Furthermore, price increases as the state of the world increases: dvdt > 0.
Assumption 4 holds for example if inverse demand is linear with constant slope: P (q; t) = a (t) bq
where b > 0 and a
0
(t) > 0, and rationing perfectly anticipated: S (p; ; t) = S (p; t). If no rationing
18
occurs,
 (Q; t) =
a (t)  bQ  (1  ) pR

(9)
is linear, hence satises conditions (i) and (ii).
Since rationing is anticipated,
v
 
pR; ; t

=
S
 
pR; t

D (pR; ; t)
= a (t)  bD
 
pR; t

2
=
a (t) + pR
2
: (10)
@v
@ = 0, and
@v
@t =
a
0
(t)
2 > 0, and v
 
pR; ; t

satises conditions (i) to (v).
Under Assumption 4, previous derivations apply if we replace P (Q; t) by  (Q; t). Thus, with a
slight abuse, I use the same notation. For example, the Cournot equilibrium output QC (c; t) is dened
by

 
QC ; t

+
QC
N
q
 
QC ; t

= c;
and t^ (K; c) by
QC
 
c; t^

= K ,   QC  c; t^ ; t^+ QC  c; t^
N
q
 
QC
 
c; t^

; t^

= c:
4.2 Admissible price caps
Suppose now a cap pW is imposed. The introduction of constant price customers also modies the set
of admissible caps. The minimum price cap is unchanged: pW  (c+ r).
The highest binding cap p1, which was the upper bound for admissible caps when  = 1, is no
longer suitable when  < 1. Instead, the V oLL v is the natural upper bound for pW . To see why,
suppose pW > v. When the cap is binding on-peak, the wholesale price is set at pW > v. The SO
must then curtail all constant price customers, since their V oLL is lower than the opportunity cost of
power. This is irrealistic.
To be admissible, a price cap must be lower than the V oLL. When the cap is binding, the SO
curtails constant price customers, who pay xed price pR, before price reactive customers, who pay
pW as long as v
 
pW ; 1; t

> v
 
pR; ; t

where  is the optimal serving ratio for constant price
consumers. This condition is always veried if rationing is perfectly anticipated, and I assume it holds
at the equilibrium, i.e., that the equilibrium capacity and the elasticity of residual demand are high
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enough that price reactive customers need not be curtailed.
At this point, it is helpful to discuss how V oLL is used in power markets. In this work, I assume the
SO knows exactly the V oLL in every state of the world. While this assumption is highly unrealistic
in practice, it constitutes a useful analytical benchmark.
In reality, regulators, SOs and economists have little idea of the V oLL. Estimation is extremely
di¢ cult, because the V oLL varies dramatically across customer classes, states of the world, and
duration and conditions of outages. Estimates vary in an extremely wide range from 2 000 $=MWh
in the British Pool in the 1990s to 200 000 $=MWh (see for example, Cramton (2000)). In practice,
the SO uses her best estimate of the average V oLL, and prioritizes curtailment by geographic zones
(using criteria such as economic activity, political weight, network conditions, etc.), thus implementing
a third best.
Both approaches produce downward sloping demand curves, and are analytically equivalent.
How do we formalize the condition pW  v? If the V oLL is a number (e.g., 20; 000 e=MWh), all
caps lower than this number are admissible.
In this article, the SO uses the true V oLL, derived from the underlying demand function. Suppose
rst the V oLL is reached on-peak. A cap is admissible if and only if:
p  v  pR; 1; t  KC (p) : (11)
Suppose now the V oLL is reached o¤-peak. As previously seen, on-peak is reached for t = t (K).
Therefore, cap binding on-peak is admissible if and only if it satises condition (11).
The natural candidate for maximum admissible cap is the smallest xed point of v
 
pR; 1; t
 
KC (:)

,
dened by
 = v
 
pR; 1; t
 
KC ()

: (12)
I prove in Appendix D that  exists, and satises
t^0
 
KC () ;

= t
 
KC ()

:
To understand this result, observe that "the price cap is lower than the V oLL" is equivalent to "the
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price cap is reached before the V oLL", i.e., t^0
 
KC (p) ; p
  t  KC (p). For the maximum admissible
cap, the price cap and the V oLL are reached simultaneously.
4.3 Summary of constant price customers
It is helpful to summarize the changes created by the introduction of constant price customers. First,
inverse demand P (Q; t) is replaced by residual inverse demand  (Q; t) in all expressions.
Second, when the wholesale price reaches the cap pW , only constant price customers are curtailed.
Third, the maximum admissible cap is , is lower than or equal to p1.
Given that the cap is admissible, two situations may occur. First, the cap is reached o¤-peak. As
long as D
 
pW ; t

+ (1  )D  pR; t < K, no curtailment occurs. On-peak, generation produces at
capacity and curtailment of constant price consumers occurs.
Alternatively, the price cap may be reached on-peak. Then, for t  t^0
 
K; pW

, generation produces
at capacity and no curtailment occurs. For t > t^0
 
K; pW

, curtailment of constant price consumers
occurs.
Since the price cap is by construction lower than the V oLL, curtailment of constant price customers
is driven by the imposition of the cap, and the serving ratio is determined by
D
 
pW ; t

+ (1  )D  pR;; t = K:
Since price reactive customers do not face the opportunity cost of the good, the serving ratio is not
"optimal".
5 Capacity and welfare maximizing price caps with constant price
customers
The analysis presented in this Section extends previous results, in particular Zöttl (2011), in two
directions. First it provides slightly more general su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a price
maximizing cap. Second, and more importantly, it shows that, contrary to the analysis presented by
Zöttl (2011), the price maximizing cap may lead to a lower welfare than no price cap. To simplify the
notation, I use p and no longer pW to represent the price cap.
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5.1 Capacity maximizing cap
Analysis similar to the case  = 1 yields:
Proposition 2 Suppose
t
 
D (c+ r; 0) + (1  )D  pR; 0 ; 0 > rf (0) ; (13)
and, for all p 2 [(c+ r) ;],
2 +
1
h
 
t^0
  f 0  t^0
f
 
t^0
   t2
t
! 
KC (p) ; p

> 0; (14)
where h (t) = f(t)1 F (t) is the hazard rate.
If
t
 
KC () ; t^0
 
KC () ;

< (  c)h   t^0  KC () ; ; (15)
there exists a unique capacity maximizing cap p^ < :
If condition (15) is not met, the capacity maximizing cap is p^ = , the maximum admissible cap.
In this case,  is also the welfare maximizing cap, and if @v@K = 0, equilibrium capacity is lower than
if no cap was imposed.
Proof. The formal proof is presented in Appendix E. Since KC (:) is continuously di¤erentiable on
[(c+ r) ;], a maximum exists. Condition (13) is equivalent to dK
C
dp (c+ r) > 0, and condition (15)
is equivalent to dK
C
dp () < 0. Thus, if condition (15) holds, there is at least one p^ 2 ((c+ r) ;) such
that dK
C
dp (p^) = 0. Finally, condition (14) guarantees that
d2KC
dp2
(p^) < 0, hence there exists a unique
capacity-maximizing cap p^ 2 ((c+ r) ;). This proves the rst part of the Proposition.
If condition (15) does not hold, then dK
C
dp (p)  0 for all p 2 [(c+ r) ;]: the unique capacity-
maximizing cap is p^ = .
From Proposition 1, p =  since dWdp (p) > 0 for all p 2 [(c+ r) ;]. It remains to prove that
KC ()  KC1. Suppose for example the V oLL is reached o¤-peak, Appendix A proves KC1 is dened
by
	4
 
KC1

=
Z +1
t(KC1)

v
 
pR; ; t

+
K
N
vq
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r = 0:
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The equilibrium capacity for the maximum admissible cap  is dened by
	2
 
KC () ;

=
Z +1
t^0(KC();)
(  c) f (t) dt  r = 0:
Then, if vq = 0,
	4
 
KC ()

=
Z +1
t(KC())
 
v
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  Z +1
t^0(KC();)
(  c) f (t) dt
=
Z +1
t(KC())
 
v
 
pR; ; t
   f (t) dt > 0
since t^0
 
KC () ;

= t
 
KC ()

. Thus, KC () < KC1. A similar analysis proves the result holds
if the V oLL is reached on-peak.
Proposition 2 extends Zöttl (2011) derivation of the capacity-maximizing cap in multiple directions.
First, it covers the realistic case of a fraction of constant price customers. Second, it derives the
capacity-maximizing cap when the cap is reached o¤-peak. This is an important extension, as this
case seems fairly realistic as long as a small fraction is price responsive. Third, it provides a more
general su¢ cient condition for the existence of a unique capacity-maximizing cap, as Zöttl (2011) had
limited his analysis to separable demands P (Q; t) = t  ~P (Q).
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that, while a capacity-maximizing cap always exists if the su¢ cient
conditions are met, this cap may lead to lower capacity than the absence of cap. This stands in sharp
contrast with Zöttl (2011) Theorems 4 and 6. The intuition is that introduction of constant price
customers imposes that the cap be lower than the V oLL, and not the highest binding cap. When
condition (15) is not met, a marginal increase in the cap, if it was feasible, would lead to higher
investment. This contrasts with the case  = 1, where a reduction in the cap from the highest binding
cap leads to higher investment. Then, if vq = 0, the never binding cap leads to higher investment.
5.2 Welfare with and without a cap
We now compare the welfare with and without a cap.
Proposition 3 If the welfare maximizing cap yields lower investment than no cap, imposing a price
cap reduces welfare.
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Proof. The details of the proof are presented in Appendix F. As shown in Section 3, introducing a
cap has an impact on installed capacity and on rationing. Appendix F shows that, for K  KC1, an
increase in capacity increases welfare. Second, the intuition of Proposition 1 extends to the presence
of constant price customers: a cap increases rationing, hence reduces gross surplus. This then yields
the result.
Proposition 3 holds in particular if p =  and vq = 0, but holds as long as KC (p)  KC1.
It reverses an important result. When a share of customers face a xed price, no cap may lead to
higher welfare than even the welfare-maximizing cap. This result has a "contradictory instruments"
avor. Imposing a xed price for a fraction of customers and a cap on price reactive customers may
be perceived as protecting customers against exercise of market power. Yet, in some instances, the
interaction between the xed price and the price cap leads to lower overall welfare than if only xed
prices were imposed.
6 Illustration on a specic case
The previous analysis indicates that, if condition (15) is not met, imposing a price cap reduces welfare.
In this Section, I examine, for an illustrative example, the range of validity of condition (15).
6.1 Model specication
Suppose that (i) demand is linear with constant slope P (Q; t) = a (t)  bQ, and a (t) = a0   a1e 2t,
(ii) states of the world are distributed according to f (t) = 1e 1t, and (ii) rationing is perfectly
anticipated. This specication provides an adequate representation of actual demand, while leading
to closed-form expressions.
This specication satises condition (14). The hazard rate of the exponential distribution is
h (t) = 1 =  f
0
(t)
f(t) . Then,
t =
a12e
 2t

) t2 =  2t ,
t2
t
=  2:
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Thus,
2 +
1
h
 
t^0
  f 0  t^0
f
 
t^0
   t2
t
!
= 2 +
1
1
( 1 + 2) = 1 + 2
1
=
+ 1

> 0:
6.2 Critical thresholds
Conditions (1) and (11) are naturally expressed as functions of p. However, for the numerical im-
plementation, we x p and let K vary to determine Kc (p). Therefore, it is helpful to recast these
conditions as functions of K. The rst on-peak state of the world t^ (K; c) is dened by
a
 
t^

= c+ (1  ) pR + N + 1
N
bK;
the rst on-peak state of the world for which the cap is binding t^0 (K; p) by
a
 
t^0

= p+ (1  ) pR + bK;
and the rst on-peak state of the world for which price reaches V oLL t (K) by
a (t (K)) =
2
2  bK + p
R:
The price cap is reached on-peak (condition (1)) if and only if
t^ (K; c)  t^0 (K; p), bK  N (p  c) = bK2 (p; ;N) :
For a given p, the prot function and the marginal value of capacity are dened piecewise for K  K2
and K > K2.
The price cap is admissible, i.e., the price cap is lower than the V oLL (condition (11) ) if and only
if
p  v  pR; 1;KC (p)() t^0  KC (p) ; p  t  KC (p)
,
p+ (1  ) pR + bKC (p)  2
2  bK
C (p) + pR , bKC (p)  (2  )  p  pR = bK3 (; p) :
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Admissibility of the price cap provides a lower bound for the admissible values of KC (p).
For the values of c, pR,  and N estimated (and discussed below), K3 (; p) > K2 (p; ;N) >
K4 (;N) for all possible values of p. In particular, if the price cap is admissible, KC (p)  K3 (; p),
then the cap is reached o¤-peak, KC (p)  K2 (p; ;N). This simplies the analysis, as shown below.
6.3 Equilibrium capacity
Since the price cap is binding o¤-peaking,
	(K; p) = 	2 (K; p) =
Z +1
t^0(K;p)
(p  c) f (t) dt = (p  c)

e 2 t^0(K;p)
   r:
Equation (3) yields
(p  c)

a0   bKC (p)  (1  ) pR   p
a1

= r
,
bKC (p) = a0   pR   
 
p  pR  a1 r
p  c
 1

:
This immediately yields
b
dKC (p)
dp
=  + 1

a1r
1

(p  c)+1
and
b
d2KC
 
pW

dp2
=  + 1
2
a1r
1

(p  c) 2+1
< 0:
KC (p) is globally concave. Since limp!+1
dKC(p)
dp =   < 0, if
b
dKC (c+ r)
dp
=
a1
r
   < 0;
there exists a unique capacity-maximizing cap p > (c+ r) dened by
p = c+
 
a1r
1


! 
1+
:
Assuming p is admissible, i.e., p  , p is increasing in c and r, increasing in a1, and decreasing
. A more inelastic demand, either due to lower underlying elasticity (higher a1) or to lower share of
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price reactive customers (lower ), leads to a higher capacity maximizing cap.
6.4 Maximum admissible price cap 
After algebraic manipulations, the function g (p) becomes
g (p) = p  v  pR; 1; t  KC (p) = 2p+ a1

r
p c
 1
   a0   pR
2   :
Therefore,
g
0
(p) =
1
2  
 
2  a1


r
p  c
 1
 1
p  c
!
:
We verify that g (:) decreasing then increasing. Since limp!+1g (p) = +1, if g (c+ r) = 2(c+r)+a1 a0 p
R
2  <
0,  is uniquely dened by
g () = 0() + a1
2

r
  c
 1

=
a0 + p
R
2
: (16)
Observe that
a0 + p
R
2
= lim
t!+1 v
 
pR; t

= lim
t!+1 
 
KC1; t

= p1:
Equation (16) illustrates that  < p1. Equation (16) also indicates that  does not depend on .
Since equation (16) does not provide a closed-form expression of , I use the equivalent condition
g (p)  0 to obtain a closed-from expression of the condition p  :
g (p)  0, p+ a1
2

r
p  c
 1

 a0 + p
R
2
:
Observing that
a1
2

r
p  c
 1

=
1
2
r
1
1+a

1+
1 ()
1
1+ ;
algebraic manipulations yield
p  , c+

1 +

2
 
a1r
1


! 
1+
 a0 + p
R
2
: (17)
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As  decreases, the left-hand side of condition (17) increases, which renders the condition more
di¢ cult to meet. This conrms previous intuition: lowering  increases p while not a¤ecting .
The impact of underlying demand elasticity  on condition (17) is ambiguous, since both a1 on
the left hand-side and a0 on the right-hand side are impacted by change in .
6.5 Numerical illustration
I estimate the parameters of the model using the realizations of electricity demand for every half-hour
in France in 2010, a set of data known as a load duration curve. a0; a1, , and bQ1, where Q1 = a0 p0b
is the maximum demand for price p0, are the parameters to be estimated.  is estimated by Maximum
Likelihood. The same load duration curve provides an expression of a0 and a1 as a function of bQ1.
The average demand elasticity  is then used to estimate bQ1. Of course, estimates of the short-run
elasticity of demand are very uncertain. I test two values of elasticities,  =  0:01 and  =  0:1
at price p0 = 100 e=MWh, that correspond respectively to the lower bound and upper bound of
estimates reported by Lijesen (2007). Following this procedure, Léautier (2014) estimates
for  =  0:18>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
bQ1 = 1 873 e=MWh
a0 = 1 973 e=MWh
a1 = 1 236 e=MWh
 = 1:78
and
for  =  0:018>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
bQ1 = 18 727 e=MWh
a0 = 18 827 e=MWh
a1 = 12 360 e=MWh
 = 1:78
:
Investment and operating costs are those of a Gas Combustion Turbine, as provided by the In-
ternational Energy Agency (median case, IEA (2010)): c = 72 e=MWh and r = 6 e=MWh. The
regulated price is pR = 50 e=MWh, close to the average of the energy component electricity price in
most European markets3. For simplicity, network charges, retail margins and taxes are excluded from
the analysis, as they vary across customer classes. Industry experts suggest  = 2% is a lower bound
for the current share of price reactive customers in most market, and  = 10% would be an upper
bound. As will be shown below, the price cap is reached before rms produce at capacity, thus the
number of rms does not matter.
3Eurostat, Table 2 Figure 2 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/images/a/a1/Energy_prices_2011s2.xls
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6.5.1 Low price elasticity
Consider rst the case  =  0:01. Equation (16) is solved numerically to yield  = 9; 237 e=MWh.
Since  vary, I express the Cournot capacity as a percentage of the rst-best capacity. KC (p) =K ()
for p 2 [c+ r;] is presented below for  = 2% (blue line on top),  = 5% (purple line intermediate),
and  = 10% (brown line at the bottom).
The capacity-maximizing cap p and the maximum capacity KC (p) =K () for each value of ,
are:
 (%) 2 5 10
p (e=MWh) 6; 793 3; 810 2; 470
KC (p) =K () (%) 98:3 97:5 96:7
:
For all values of , there exists a unique interior capacity-maximizing cap, i.e., p < . Further-
more, Cournot capacity at p is very close to the rst-best.
The optimal price cap p is higher than the caps in place in most US markets, and except for the
case  = 10%, higher than the 3; 000 e/MWh cap on the day-ahead market in continental Europe
and the 5; 000 $=MWh cap in e¤ect in Texas.
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6.5.2 High price elasticity
Consider now  =  0:1. Equation (16) is solved numerically to yield  = 974 e=MWh. Why is
 = 974 e=MWh much lower than the caps in e¤ect in Europe and in Texas? Policy makers use
their estimate of the V oLL to set the cap, and not the V oLL consistent with the underlying demand
function. Thus, their estimate of the V oLL is consistent with demand elasticity of  =  0:01 (at price
100 e/MWh, assuming demand is linear), and inconsistent with demand elasticity of  =  0:1. This
low elasticity bias is consistent with the view held by many policy makers and commentators that
electricity is an essential good, and that disruptions are very costly.
KC
 
pW

=K () is presented below  = 2% (blue line on top),  = 5% (purple line intermediate),
and  = 10% (brown line at the bottom).
The capacity maximizing price cap p and the maximum capacity are:
 (%) 2 5 10
p (e=MWh) 974 927 621
KC (p) =K () (%) 97:7 96:3 94:4
:
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For  = 2%, p = : the capacity cap is the highest admissible cap. Thus, Cournot capacity is
strictly lower than without a cap, although the numerical di¤erence is small. For higher values of ,
p < .
The resulting Cournot capacity is slightly further away from the rst-best.
7 Concluding remarks
Price caps are often used by policy makers to "regulate markets". Previous analyses have focussed on
the "supply side" impact of these caps, and derived the optimal price cap, which maximizes investment
and welfare. This article expands the analysis to include the "demand side" impact of price caps: when
prices can no longer rise, customers must be rationed to adjust demand to available supply. This yields
two new ndings, that contradict previous analyses. First, the welfare-maximizing cap is higher than
the capacity-maximizing cap, since increasing the cap increases gross surplus when customers are
rationed. Second, in some cases, the capacity-maximizing cap leads to lower capacity and welfare
than no cap. These ndings underscores the importance for policy makers to examine the impact on
customers when they impose price caps.
These ndings are particularly relevant for the electric power industry where caps are frequently
imposed to limit the exercise of market power. They also apply to other industries, such as housing,
where rent controls are often imposed, and health care, where a fraction of customers face constant
prices, and caps on prices are sometimes imposed.
It would be important to test empirically these ndings. An illustrative model of the power
industry shows that no price cap producing higher welfare than any cap arises for realistic values of
the parameters. I would like to test this hypothesis using a di¤erent specication and demand for the
power industry. Closed-form solutions may not obtain, but numerical analysis will conrm (or inrm)
the ndings. It would also be interesting to test other industries, for example housing and health care,
where price controls are prevalent, and market power, at least in some local markets, a possibility.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider N producers, each with installed capacity kn, ordered such that k1  :::  kN . n (kn;k n)
is producers n prot for the two-stage game.
A.1 Price cap binding on-peak
Suppose the price cap pW is binding on-peak: t^ (K; c)  t^0
 
K; pW

. Technical supplement G derives
the equilibrium capacity in that case. Lemma 2 presented in Technical supplement G characterizes
the equilibrium of the energy markets as follows: there exists N critical states of the world 0  t1 
t2  :::  tN such that, for t 2 [tj ; tj+1 ], all producers i  j produce their entire capacity ki, while all
producers n > j produce j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t) dened on [tj ; tj+1 ] as the solution of a "modied Cournot
condition":

 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
  c+ j+1q
 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
= 0:
bQ (t) = Pji=1 ki + (N   j)j+1 (t) is increasing in t. For t  t1 , bQ (t) = QC (c; t). For t  tN , all
producers produce their entire capacity kn, hence bQ (t) =PNn=1 kn.
A.2 Price cap binding o¤-peak
Suppose the price cap is reached o¤-peak: t^0
 
K; pW

< t^ (K; c). Without loss of generality since we
are ultimately looking for a symmetric equilibrium, suppose the price cap is binding before t1, i.e.,
there exists ~t0 2 0; t1 such that  bQ  ~t0 ; ~t0 = pW .
Dene ~q1 (t) by 
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

= pW . qn = ~q1 (t) for all n  1 is the unique equilibrium for t  ~t0,
as long as producer 1 is not constrained. To prove the result, it is helpful to ensure that the Cournot
price 
 bQ (t) ; t is increasing with the state of the world. This requires a slightly stronger Assumption
than Assumption 4:
Assumption 5 For all t  0, Q  0,  2 (0; 1] 0, and pR > 0,
t (Q; t)

1 +
Qqq (Q; t)
q (Q; t)

> Qqt (Q; t) :
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Then, 8t > ~t0

 bQ (t) ; t >  bQ  ~t0 ; ~t0 = pW ;
hence

 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

= pW < 
 bQ (t) ; t
()
~q1 (t) >
bQ (t)
N
:
This is the classical result: in each state of the world, a price cap reduces rmsability to reduce
output.
Suppose all rms n > 1 produce ~q1 (t), while rm 1 considers deviating. A negative deviation is
unprotable since it reduces output but cannot increase price, which is capped at pW . Then, since
~q1 (t) >
bQ(t)
N and the marginal revenue is decreasing,
@1
@q1
 
~q1 (t) ; :::; ~q1 (t) ; t

= 
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

+ ~q1 (t) q
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t
  c
< 
 bQ (t) ; t+ bQ (t)
N
q
 bQ (t) ; t  c = @n
@qn
 bQ (t)
N
; :::;
bQ (t)
N
; t
!
= 0:
A positive deviation is not protable. qn = ~q1 (t) for all n  1 is a symmetric equilibrium. Since the
prot function is concave, this equilibrium is unique.
When t = ~t1 characterized by ~q1 (t) = k1 ()   Nk1; t1 = pW , producer 1 is constrained.
Similarly, for t 2 ~tj ; ~tj+1 for j = 1; :::; N 1, the unique symmetric equilibrium for the (N   j) re-
maining producers is ~qj+1 (t) where 
Pj
i=1 k
i + (N   j) ~qj+1 (t) ; t

= pW . ~tN is such that 
PN
j=1 k
j ; ~tN

=
pW , hence ~tN = t^0
 
K; pW

previously dened. For t > ~tN , since wholesale price is xed at pW and
generation is at capacity, the SO must curtail constant price consumers.
Consider now producer n expected prot, given capacities k1  :::  kN , and the structure of the
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equilibrium described above:
n (kn;k n) =
Z ~t0
0
Q^
N



Q^

  c

f (t) dt
+
 
pW   c n 1X
i=0
Z ~ti+1
~ti
~qi+1 (t) f (t) dt+ kn
 
1  F  ~tn!  rkn
Thus, for all n  N ,
@n
@kn
=
Z +1
~tn
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
since output is continuous, and
@2n
(@kn)2
=    pW   c f  ~tn @~tn
@kn
< 0:
If there exists K such that
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z +1
t^0(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r = 0;
then KN for all n = 1; :::; N is the unique symmetric equilibrium. For any t  0, limK!+1  (K; t) < c,
thus limK!+1 t
 
K; pW

= +1, hence limK!+1 @n@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

=  r < 0.
If  (0; t)  pW for all t  0, which I assume holds, t^0
 
0; pW

= 0 and
@n
@kn
(0; :::; 0) =
Z +1
0
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r = pW   (c+ r) > 0:
A.3 No price cap imposed
If the V oLL is reached on-peak, the equilibrium is identical to the case  = 1, recognizing that
 (K; t) = v
 
pR; ; t

when curtailment occurs.
Suppose the V oLL is reached o¤-peak: t (K) < t^ (K; c). As before, suppose the V oLL is reached
before producer 1 reaches capacity, i.e. there exists bt0 2 0; t1 such that  bQ  bt0 ;bt0 = v  pR; 1;bt0.
As long as the total generation is not at capacity, there is no rationing. Price is thus v
 
pR; 1; t

,
independent of output. The same argument as above shows that, qn = q^1 (t) dened by 
 
Nq^1 (t) ; t

=
v
 
pR; 1; t

for all n  1 is the unique equilibrium for t  bt0, as long as producer 1 is not at capacity.
Similarly, for t 2 t^j ; t^j+1 for j = 1; :::; N   1, the unique symmetric equilibrium for the (N   j)
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remaining producers is q^j+1 (t) where 
Pj
i=1 k
i + (N   j) q^j+1 (t) ; t

= v
 
pR; 1; t

.
Consider now producer n expected prot, given capacities k1  :::  kN , and the structure of the
equilibrium described above:
n (kn;k n) =
Z bt0
0
Q^
N



Q^

  c

f (t) dt
+
 
v
 
pR; 1; t
  c n 1X
i=1
Z t^i+1
t^i
q^i+1 (t) f (t) dt
!
+kn
 Z t(K)
t^n
 
v
 
pR; 1; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t(K)
 
v
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r! :
Thus, for all n  N ,
@n
@kn
=
Z t(K)
t^n
 
v
 
pR; 1; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t(K)

v
 
pR; ; t

+ kn
@v
@K
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r
since output is continuous. If a symmetric equilibrium

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

exists, it satises:
@n
@kn

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

=
Z +1
t(K)

v
 
pR; ; t

+
KC
N
@v
@K
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r = 0
As before, limKC
N
!+1
@n
@kn

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

< 0 and @
n
@kn (0; :::; 0) =
R +1
0
 
v
 
pR; ; t
  c f (t) dt  r >
E [ (0; t)]  (c+ r) > 0, thus existence of KCN is guaranteed.
Proving that

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

is the unique symmetric equilibrium is a bit more complex, since we
need to treat separately an upward and a downward deviation. It is proven following the argument
presented in the Technical supplement.
B Existence and characterization of the maximum of KC (p)
Existence 	1 (:; :) and 	2 (:; :) are continuously di¤erentiable in both variables by inspection; for
any K, 	(K; :) is continuous for at pW such that t^ (K; c) = t^0
 
K; pW

, hence KC (:) is continuous on
the compact set [(c+ r) ; p1], thus, admits a maximum.
Furthermore, KC (:) is continuously di¤erentiable. By inspection of equation (4), the only potential
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problem could arise at the pivotal price cap p0 dened t^
 
KC (p0) ; c

= t^0
 
KC (p0) ; p0

. However,
lim
p!p0
pp0
@	1
@K
=
KC (p0)
N
Pq
 
KC (p0) ; t^0

f
 
t^0
 @t^0
@K
=   (p0   c) f
 
t^0
 @t^0
@K
= lim
p!p0
pp0
@	2
@K
since p0 +
KC(p0)
N Pq
 
KC (p0) ; t^0

= c by construction. Thus, KC (:) is continuously di¤erentiable on
[(c+ r) ; p1].
The long-run marginal cost (c+ r) is not a maximum Let us examine dK
C
dp (c+ r). We rst
prove that a cap set at (c+ r) is binding o¤-peak. By contradiction, suppose the cap is reached
on-peak:
	1 (K; c+ r) =
Z t^0(K;c+r)
t^(K;c)

 (K; t) +
K
N
q (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+ (c+ r   c)  1  F  t^0 (K; c+ r)  r
For t  t^0 (K; c+ r),  (K; t)  (c+ r), thus  (K; t) + KN q (K; t)  c < r, hence
	(K; c+ r) < r
 
1  F  t^ (K; c)  r  rF  t^ (K; c)  0:
Thus, there cannot exists KC such that 	
 
KC ; c+ r

= r. This constitutes a contradiction, a cap
set at (c+ r) is binding o¤-peak. By continuity, so is a cap set around (c+ r).
Since the cap is binding o¤-peak,
	(K; c+ r) = 	2 (K; c+ r) =  rF
 
t^0 (K; c+ r)

:
Thus,
	
 
KC (c+ r) ; c+ r

= 0, F  t^0  KC (c+ r) ; c+ r = 0, t^0  KC (c+ r) ; c+ r = 0:
On-peak starts at t = 0. Thus,
P
 
KC (c+ r) ; 0

= (c+ r), KC (c+ r) = D ((c+ r) ; 0) :
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Inserting into equation (4), and observing that
@	2
@K
(K; p) =   (p  c) f  t^0 (K; p) @t^0 (K; p)
@K
;
@t^0 (K; p)
@p
=
1
Pt
 
K; t^0
 ; and @t^0 (K; p)
@K
=
 Pq
 
K; t^0

Pt
 
K; t^0

yields
dKC
dp
(c+ r) =
1  rf (0) 1
Pt(KC(c+r);0)
rf (0)
 Pq(KC(c+r);0)
Pt(KC(c+r);0)
 = Pt  KC (c+ r) ; 0  rf (0) Pq (KC (c+ r) ; 0) rf (0) ;
thus
dKC
dp
(c+ r) > 0, Pt (D ((c+ r) ; 0) ; 0)  rf (0) > 0
which I assume holds.
The rst never-binding cap p1 is not a maximum The Cournot capacity for the highest
binding cap p1 is KC1 = KC (p1). Since p1 is (almost) never binding, it is not binding o¤-peak,
hence KC1 dened by
Z +1
t^(KC1;c)

P
 
KC1; t

+
K
N
Pq
 
KC1; t
  c f (t) dt = r:
Introduce also
MR1 = lim
t!+1

P
 
KC1; t

+
K
N
Pq
 
KC1; t

:
MR1 < p1 since Pq (:; :) < 0. Then for pW 2 (MR1; p1) and high enough that it is not binding
o¤-peak, the marginal value of capacity at KC1 is
	1
 
KC1; p
W

=
Z t^0(KC1;pW )
t^(KC1;c)

P
 
KC1; t

+
KC1
N
Pq
 
KC1; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^0(KC1;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
=
Z t^0(KC1;pW )
t^(KC1;c)

P
 
KC1; t

+
KC1
N
Pq
 
KC1; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t^0(KC1;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt
 
Z +1
t^(KC1;c)

P
 
KC1; t

+
K
N
Pq
 
KC1; t
  c f (t) dt
=
Z +1
t^0(KC1;pW )

pW  

P
 
KC1; t

+
K
N
Pq
 
KC1; t

f (t) dt
>
Z +1
t^0(KC1;pW )
 
pW  MR1 f (t) dt > 0:
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Thus, KC1 < KC
 
pW

, hence p1 is not the capacity-maximizing cap.
Necessary rst-order condition The analysis above proves existence of an interior maximum,
denoted p^W . Since KC (:) is continuously di¤erentiable, we must have dK
C
dp
 
p^W

= 0.
C Properties of the V oLL
When capacity is constrained and if curtailment occurs, total di¤erentiation of the energy balance
K = D
 
v
 
pR; ; t

; t

+ (1  )D  pR; ; t
with respect to K yields
@
@K
=
1
@D@p
@v
@ + (1  ) @D@
:
@v
@  0 guarantees that @

@K > 0 and
@v
@K =
@v
@
@
@K  0.
Total di¤erentiation of the energy balance with respect to t yields
@
@t
=  


@D
@p
@v
@t +
@D
@t

+ (1  ) @D@t
@D@p
@v
@ + (1  ) @D@
:
Conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the optimal serving ratio decreases as the state of the world
increases: @

@t < 0. If curtailment occurs in state t, it also occurs in all states t  t. Furthermore,
price increases as the state of the world increases:
dv
dt
=
@v
@
@
@t
+
@v
@t
> 0:
D Existence and property of 
Dene
g (p) = p  v  pR; 1; t  KC (p) :
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A root of g (:) is a xed point of v
 
pR; 1; t
 
KC (:)

. If p = c + r, the same argument as for  = 1
shows that the price cap is binding immediately: t^0
 
KC (c+ r) ; (c+ r)

= 0. Then,
g (c+ r) = c+ r   v  pR; 1; t  KC (c+ r)  c+ r   v  pR; 1; 0 < 0
since t
 
KC (c+ r)
  0, vt > 0, and v  pR; 1; 0 > (c+ r) by assumption. Suppose g (:) admits a root
on ((c+ r) ; p1); i.e., there exists p < p1 such that g (p) = 0. The maximum admissible cap is the
smallest root: since g (c+ r) < 0, g (p)  0 for p  .
If g (p) < 0 for all p < p1, the maximum admissible cap is the never binding cap; i.e.,  = p1.
By denition,

 
KC () ; t^0
 
KC () ;

= ;
and

 
KC () ; t
 
KC ()

= v
 
pR; 1; t
 
KC ()

= :
Since v
 
pR; 1; t
 
KC ()

= ,

 
KC () ; t^0
 
KC () ;

= 
 
KC () ; t
 
KC ()
, t^0  KC () ; = t  KC ()
since t > 0.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Since KC (:) is continuous on [(c+ r) ;], it admits a maximum p^ 2 [(c+ r) ;]. From equation (4),
dKC
dp () < 0 if and only if
1  F  t^0  (  c) f  t^0 @t^0
@p
< 0, t
 
KC () ; t^0

< (  c)h   t^0 :
Di¤erentiation of equation (4) yields
d2KC
dp2
=
   @	@K   @2	@K@p dKCdp + @2	@p2   @	@p @2	@K2 
@	
@K
2 ;
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hence
d2KC
dp2
(p^) =
@2	
@p2
  @	@K
 
KC (p^) ; p^

since
dKC
dp
(p^) =
@	
@p
 
KC (p^) ; p^

= 0
by denition of p^. Then,
@2	
@p2
=  
 
2f
 
t^0
 @t^0
@p
+ (p  c)
 
f
0  
t^0
@t^0
@p
2
+ f
 
t^0
 @2t^0
@p2
!!
:
Observing that
@2t^0
@p2
=   t2
(t)
2
1
t
;
yields
@2	
@p2
=  @t^0
@p
f
 
t^0
 
2 +
p  c
t
 
f
0  
t^0

f
 
t^0
   t2
t
!!
:
Since; p ct =
1
h(t^0)
for p = p^,
@2	
@p2
(p^) =  @t^0
@p
f
 
t^0
 
2 +
1
h
 
t^0
  f 0  t^0
f
 
t^0
   t2
t
!
(p^)
!
and
2 +
1
h
 
t^0
  f 0  t^0
f
 
t^0
   t2
t
!
(p^) > 0, @
2	
@p2
(p^) > 0, d
2KC
dp2
(p^) < 0:
Thus, p^ is the unique maximum of KC (:) on [(c+ r) ;). The argument proceeds by contradiction:
if there was another p such that dK
C
dp (p
) = 0, then d
2KC
dp2
(p) < 0: p is another local maximum.
Since KC (:) is continuous, there would be a local minimum between these two local maxima, i.e. a
price p such that dK
C
dp (p
) = 0. Then d
2KC
dp2
(p) < 0: p cannot be a local minimum. This
constitutes a contradiction. Hence KC (:) is concave on [(c+ r) ;), and p^ is the unique maximum of
KC (:) on ((c+ r) ;).
Suppose now dK
C
dp () > 0.  is the unique maximum of K
C (:) on [(c+ r) ;]. The proof proceeds
again by contradiction. Suppose there exists p^ <  such that dK
C
dp (p^) = 0. By the previous argument,
p^ is the unique maximum, hence KC (:) is concave on [(c+ r) ;), thus dK
C
dp () < 0, which constitutes
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a contradiction. Thus, dK
C
dp (p) > 0 for all p 2 [(c+ r) ;], and  is the unique maximum of KC (:)
on [(c+ r) ;].
F Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I prove that W1 (K), the expected net surplus given
imperfect competition and absent any price cap, is a concave function of installed capacity with
a unique maximum K1. Second, I prove that KC1 < K1, hence W1 (K) is increasing for K 
KC1. Finally, I prove that imposition of a price cap reduces expected net surplus. Specically, for
capacity KC (p), the expected net surplus with cap p is lower than without a cap: W
 
KC (p) ; p

<
W1
 
KC (p)

. Then, since KC (p) < KC1, the result follows.
Suppose the V oLL is reached on-peak. Consider rst that no price cap is imposed. The net surplus
o¤-peak is
~S (t) = S
 

 
QC (c; t) ; t

; t

+ (1  )S  pR; t  cQC (c; t) :
For capacity K, the net surplus on-peak before the price reaches the V oLL is
~S (K; t) = S ( (K; t) ; t) + (1  )S  pR; t  cK;
and is
~S (K; t) = S ( (K; t) ; t) + (1  )S  pR; ; t  cK
after the price reaches the V oLL.
The expected net surplus for capacity K is
W1 (K) =
Z t^(K;c)
0
~S (t) f (t) dt+
Z t(K)
t^(K;c)
~S (K; t) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K)
~S (K; t) f (t) dt  rK:
We have:
dW1
dK
=
Z t(K)
t^(K;c)
@ ~S
@K
(K; t) f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K)
@ ~S
@K
(K; t) f (t) dt  r:
Then,
@ ~S
@K
(K; t) =  (K; t)  c
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and
@ ~S
@K
(K; t) =  (K; t)

1  (1  ) @D
@
@
@K

+ (1  ) @S
@
@
@K
  c
=  (K; t) + (1  )

@S
@
  @D
@
 (K; t)

@
@K
  c
=  (K; t) + (1  )  v  pR; ; t   (K; t) @D
@
@
@K
=  (K; t)  c:
Thus,
dW1
dK
=
Z +1
t^(K;c)
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt  r;
hence
d2W1
dK2
=
Z +1
t^(K;c)
q (K; t) f (t) dt 
 

 
t^ (K; c) ; t
  c f  t^ @t^
@K
< 0:
W1 (:) is globally concave. The usual arguments show that there exists a unique K1 that maximizes
W1 (:), uniquely dened by
dW1
dK
(K1) =
Z +1
t^(K1;c)
( (K1; t)  c) f (t) dt  r = 0:
One immediately veries that
dW1
dK
 
KC1

=
Z +1
t^(KC1;c)
 

 
KC1; t
  c f (t) dt  r = KC1
N
Z +1
t^(KC1;c)
  q  KC1; t f (t) dt > 0;
thus
KC1 < K

1 )W1
 
KC1

< W1 (K1) :
Consider now a price cap p is imposed, which is reached on-peak. The net surplus after the price
reaches the V oLL is
S (K; t) = S (p; t) + (1  )S  pR;; t  cK
where  such that
D (p; t) + (1  )D  pR;; t = K:
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Observe that
S (K; t) < ~S (K; t)
since price reactive consumers do not face the opportunity cost of power. Thus the expected net
surplus is
W1
 
KC (p) ; p

=
Z t^(KC(p);c)
0
~S (t) f (t) dt+
Z t^0(KC(p);p)
t^(KC(p);c)
~S
 
KC (p) ; t

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(p);p)
S (K; t) f (t) dt  rKC (p)
Therefore,
W1
 
KC (p) ; p

= W1
 
KC (p)
  Z t(KC(p))
t^0(KC(p);p)
~S (K; t) f (t) dt 
Z +1
t(KC(p))
~S (K; t) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t^0(KC(p);p)
S (K; t) f (t) dt
= W1
 
KC (p)
  Z t(KC(p))
t^0(KC(p);p)

~S (K; t)  S (K; t)

f (t) dt
 
Z +1
t(KC(p))

~S (K; t)  S (K; t)

f (t) dt
< W1
 
KC (p)

since ~S (K; t)   S (K; t) > 0 and ~S (K; t)   S (K; t) > 0. For the same capacity, imposing a price cap
reduces net surplus. Then, since KC (p) < KC1,
W1
 
KC (p) ;

< W1
 
KC (p)

< W1
 
KC1

;
which completes the proof.
Similar arguments apply if the cap or the V oLL are reached o¤-peak.
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G Derivation of the Cournot capacity
For the readers convenience, the derivation of the Cournot equilibrium capacity is presented here.
The proof follows Zöttl (2011). The main di¤erence is the introduction of rationing.
G.1 Capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium without a price cap
Producers are ordered by increasing capacity: k1  k2 :::  kN .
The unconstrained Cournot aggregate outputQC (t) in state t is dened by  (Q; t) c+QN q (Q; t) =
0. Under Assumption 4, the implicit function theorem yields:
dQC
dt
=  

t +
Q
N
qt

q +
q +Qqq
N
 1
> 0
Lemma 2 Dene t0 = 0. For a given vector k 2RN of generation capacities, there exists N critical
states of the world 0  t1  t2  :::  tN such that q^n (k;t), the equilibrium output for producer n, is
characterized by
q^n (k;t) =
8><>: 
j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t) if t 2 [tj ; tj+1 ] for j < n
kn if t  tn
where j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t) dened on [tj ; tj+1 ] is the solution of a "modied Cournot condition":

 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
  c+ j+1q
 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
= 0
8n  N , q^n (k;t) is continuous in all its arguments and increasing in t.
Producers expected prot is:
n (kn ;k n) =
n 1X
j=0
Z tj+1
tj
j+1



Q^

  c

f (t) dt+ kn
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj



Q^

  c

f (t) dt  r
#
where Q^ (k;t) =
PN
n=1 q^
n (k;t) is the aggregate output.
Proof. Construction of the equilibrium proceeds by induction on n  N . As seen previously, QC (t)
is increasing in t. Denote t1 the rst state such that QC (t1) = k1. Suppose t1 ! +1, then 8t  0,
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QC (t) < k1  k2  :::  kN . Then:
1 (k1 ;k 1) = E

QC (t)
 

 
QC (t) ; t
  c  rk1
and @
1
@k1 =  r < 0, hence 1
 
k1

< 0 since 1 (0) = 0. This contradicts producer 1 individual
rationality, hence t1 exists by contradiction. Denote Q^1 (t) = QC (t) and 1 (t) = Q
C(t)
N .
Suppose now we have characterized the equilibrium up until tn, dened by n (k1 ; :::; kn 1 ; tn) = kn.
We now search for an equilibrium for t  tn. Suppose all generators i = 1; ::; n produce up to their
capacity ki. The prot of any generator j > n is:
j (qj ;q j ; t) = qj
0BB@
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA  c
1CCA
As long as producer (n+ 1) is not constrained, we have:
@j
@qj
= 
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA  c+ qjq
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA
Since the rst-order conditions are symmetric, a symmetric interior equilibrium n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) is
characterized by:

 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
  c+ n+1q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
= 0
Since j (:; t) is strictly concave, n+1 is a maximum, hence it constitutes a best response to the others
strategies. n+1 is increasing in t, since by the implicit function theorem:
@n+1
@t
=   t + 
n+1qt
(N   n+ 1)

q +
N n
N n+1
n+1qq
 > 0
Furthermore, n+1 (tn) = n (tn) = kn. To see that, we observe that n+1 (tn) veries:
@j
@qj
(tn) = 
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; tn
!
  c+ n+1q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; tn
!
= 0
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while n (t) solves:

 
n 1X
i=1
ki + (N   n+ 1)n ; t
!
  c+ nq
 
n 1X
i=1
ki + (N   n+ 1)n ; t
!
= 0
hence, since q^n (tn) = kn by construction:

 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n) kn ; tn
!
  c+ knq
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n) kn ; tn
!
= 0
Since j (:; tn) is strictly concave, there exists a unique value such that @
j
@qj (t
n) = 0 hence n+1 (tn) =
kn = n (tn).
Producer (n+ 1) produces n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) up to tn+1 dened by n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) = kn+1. As
before, we can show by contradiction that tn+1 exists. Furthermore, since kn+1  kn, then tn+1  tn.
We now show that ql = kl for l  n is a best response to qj = n+1 for j > n. Suppose
qi = ki 8i  n; i 6= l and qj = n+1 for j > n. Then:
@l
@ql
= 
0B@ nX
i=1
i6=j
ki + ql + (N   n)n+1 ; t
1CA  c+ qlq
0B@ nX
i=1
i6=j
ki + ql + (N   n)n+1 ; t
1CA
hence
@l
@ql

ql=kl
= 
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
  c+ klq
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
=   (n+1   kl) q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
> 0
since n+1 (t) > n+1 (tn) = kn  kj for t > tn.
We have therefore completed step (n+ 1). By induction, the structure of the equilibria holds up
until n = N , as long as we adopt the convention: tN+1 ! +1, N+1 (t) = 0 and Q^ (tN ) = K = Q^ (t)
8t  tN .
From the previous discussion, q^n (k;t) and Q^ (k;t) are continuous and increasing in t.
The expression of prots follow directly from the characterization of equilibria above.
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G.2 Capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium with price cap
Lemma 3 Suppose the capacity constraint binds before the price cap constraint, i.e., tN  t  K; pW 
at the equilibrium. Producer ns equilibrium prot for the constrained Cournot game in state t is:
n (kn;k n) =
n 1X
j=0
Z tj+1
tj
j+1



Q^

  c

f (t) dt (18)
+kn
8<:
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj



Q^

  c

f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
9=;
where tj for j = 1; :::; N is the rst state of the world such that all producers up to j are capacity
constrained, t0 = 0 and the convention tN+1 = t
 
K; pW

, j+1 is producer ns output in state t 2
tj ; tj+1

for j < n, and Q^ is the equilibrium aggregate output.
Proof. In the o¤-peak states of the world where at least one generator is unconstrained, i.e., with our
previous notation t < tN (K)  t  K; pW , imposition of the price cap has no impact on the equilibrium
in these states, and Lemma 2 applies.
Consider now the peak states of the world t  tN (K), and Q^ (t) = K =
NX
m=1
km. As long as
 (K; t)  pW , imposition of the price cap has no impact on the equilibrium in these states, and
Lemma 2 applies.
States of the world may exist where  (K; t) > pW . Then, for t  t  K; pW , p (t) = pW . Facing a
constant price, generators individually maximize production to maximize prot, hence qn (t) = kn for
all n is an equilibrium. This then yields equation (18). However, the SO must ration demand.
G.3 Equilibrium investment
Lemma 4 For any (kn;k n):
@n
@kn
(kn;k n) =
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj
 


Q^

  c+ knq

Q^
 @Q^
@kn
!
f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r:
(19)
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For any kN  KN
@2N
(@kN )2

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt (20)
+kNq

K^; t

K^; pW

f

t

K^; pW
 @tK^; pW
@kN
< 0
where K^ = kn + N 1N K. Furthermore, 
n
 
K
N ; ::;
K
N

is globally concave.
Proof. The rst-order derivative of prot function is:
@n
@kn
=
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj
 


Q^

  c+ knq

Q^
 @Q^
@kn
!
f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r +1
where
1 = kn
NX
j=n



Q^ (tj+1) ; tj+1

  c

f (tj+1 )
@tj+1
@kn
 



Q^ (tj ) ; tj

  c

f (tj )
@tj
@kn

+q^n (tn)



Q^ (tn) ; tn

  c

f (tn)
@tn
@kn
  kn  pW   c f  t  K; pW  @t  K; pW 
@kn
= 0
since q^n (tn) = kn and 

Q^
 
t
 
K; pW

; t
 
K; pW

= pW . This proves equation (19).
Suppose kN  KCN while kn = K
C
N for all n < N . Equation (19) yields:
@N
@kN

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)
 
 (K; t) + kNq (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt r:
Thus:
@2N
@ (kN )2

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt
+kNq

K^; t
 
K; pW

f
 
t
 
K; pW
 @t  K; pW 
@kN
< 0:
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This proves equation (20). Then, selecting kN = KN proves the global concavity of 
n
 
K
N ; ::;
K
N

.
Lemma 5 KC solution of
Z t(K;pW )(KC)
tN (KC)


 
KC ; t

+
KC
N
q
 
KC ; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t(KC ;pW )(KC)
 
pW   c f (t) dt = r
is the only symmetric equilibrium investment.
Proof. If kn = KN , for all n, all producers are constrained simultaneously: t
n = tN for all n. The rst
order derivative (19) then becomes:
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)

 (K; t) +
K
N
q (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt r:
@n
@kn (0; :::; 0) =
R t(K;pW )
0 ( (0; t)  c) f (t) dt +
R +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt   r > pW   (c+ r) > 0
since  (0; t) > pW > (c+ r) by equation (??). limK!+1 @
n
@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

=  r < 0. Hence KC > 0
such that @
n
@kn

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

= 0 exists.
We now prove that

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

is an equilibrium. Consider rst a negative deviation: k1  KCN
while kn = K
C
N for all n > 1. Total installed capacity is K = k
1 + N 1N K
C  KC .
@1
@k1

k1 ;
KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
 
Z t(KC ;pW )
tN (KC)


 
KC

+
KC
N
q
 
KC
  c f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  Z +1
t(KC ;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt
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tN (K)  tN  KC and t  K; pW  (K)  tpW  KC since K < KC . Then:
@1
@k1

k1 ;
KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z tN(KC)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)

 (K) + k1q (K) 


 
KC

+
KC
N
q
 
KC

f (t) dt
+
Z t(KC ;pW )
t(K;pW )

pW     KC  KC
N
q
 
KC

f (t) dt:


Q^

+k1q

Q^

 c =  k1   N q Q^ @Q^@k1  0 for t 2 t1; tN (K).   K; tN (K)+k1q  K; tN (K) =
c, and t (K) + k
1qt (K)  0, hence  (K) + k1q (K)   c  0 for t 2

tN (K) ; tN
 
KC

. q (Q) +
qqq (Q) < 0, hence  (K)+k
1q (K)   (K)+K
C
N q (K)  
 
KC

+K
C
N q
 
KC
 
k1   KCN

q

Q^

@Q^
@k1 
0 for t 2 tN (K) ; t  K; pW  (K). Finally,   KC  pW for t  tpW (KC), hence pW     KC  
KC
N q
 
KC
  0 for t 2 ht  K; pW  (K) ; tpW (KC)i. Thus, @1@k1 k1 ; KCN ; :::; KCN   0: a negative devi-
ation is not protable.
From equation (20), @
N
@kN

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N ; k
N

is decreasing for kN  KCN , hence @
N
@kN

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N ; k
N


0: a positive deviation is not protable.
Therefore,

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

is a symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, KC is the only symmetric
equilibrium since n
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is globally concave.
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